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CONTRACT RIGHTS UNDER THE I-864 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT: 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING  
BINDS COURTS’ HANDS IN A  
SHIFTING LANDSCAPE FOR PUBLIC 
CHARGE DOCTRINE 
JOHN T. BURGER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Annually, more than half a million sponsors enter into a 
contract with the United States Government.1  The consideration 
to the sponsor is almost entirely speculative and unknown.  The 
sponsor’s obligations are indefinite and may be subject to change 
by the Government after signing.  The sponsors routinely sign 
these agreements without proper counsel, or with interested 





† Candidate for Juris Doctor, St. John’s University School of Law Class of 2020. 
I would like to give special thanks to Professor Keith Sharfman, my Faculty Advisor 
for this Note, for providing invaluable assistance and direction in my first academic 
paper, and to Professor Anita Krishnakumar, for her perceptive feedback and 
insight into issues of statutory interpretation. Many thanks as well to Evan Soyer, 
Caitlin Bonanno, Jamie Zeevi, Anthony Nania, and the rest of the St. John’s Law 
Review for their patience, hard work, and thoughtful suggestions and edits. 
1  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANN. FLOW REP.: LAWFUL PERMANENT  
RESIDENTS 5 (Aug. 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2017.pdf. “[M]ore than half a million sponsors” is an 
estimate based on the number of Family-Based Lawful Permanent Resident 
applications approved by the U.S. Government between 2015 and 2017. To be 
approved, most of these applications require a properly executed Affidavit of 
Support, discussed at infra Part I. It is difficult to know precisely how many 
Affidavits of Support are executed on an annual basis. More than one sponsor can 
sign for a single immigrant, while multiple immigrants can be sponsored by the 
same immigrant. For this reason, “more than half a million” is an estimate based on 
a one-to-one, sponsor-to-immigrant ratio, where the number of approved 
applications has ranged from 678,978 to 804,793 between 2015 and 2017. Id. 
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enforce these agreements against sponsors, possibly on a massive 
scale.2  And, if recent case law holds firm, these sponsors will be 
absolutely defenseless to such claims in a court of law. 
The I-864, or Affidavit of Support (“Affidavit”), is a 
statutorily created contract between the United States 
Government and a sponsor to an immigrant.3  The sponsor agrees 
to provide support to the sponsored immigrant where it is 
necessary to prevent that immigrant from becoming a public 
charge.4  In the I-864, the sponsor agrees that the immigrant will 
remain at above 125% of the poverty line; if the immigrant falls 
below the poverty line, the sponsor will be required to issue 
support payments to make up the difference.5  Furthermore, if 
the immigrant receives public benefits that are included in the 
public charge guidelines, the agency issuing the benefit may hold 
the sponsor liable and recoup those benefits under the I-864.6  
The sponsor’s obligations to the immigrant are indefinite and do 
not sever upon divorce.7 
This Affidavit, including the required obligations, is a 
mandatory part of public charge determinations.8  To ensure that 
an immigrant is admissible, most family-based immigrants must 
show,9 through a totality of the circumstances, that they are not 
“likely at any time to become a public charge.”10  If they fail to do 
so, they will be deemed inadmissible and will be unable to enter 
the United States.11  While the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has historically defined a “public 
charge” as “an individual who is likely to become primarily  
 
 
2 See Memorandum on Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of 
Aliens, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201900334 (May 23, 2019) [hereinafter May 
23 Memo]. 
3 Greg McLawsen, The I-864 Affidavit of Support: An Intro to the Immigration 
Form You Must Learn To Love/Hate, 48 FAM. L.Q. 581, 583 (2015). 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) (2012). 
5 McLawsen, supra note 3, at 583. 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(1)(A). 
7 Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/i-864 [hereinafter “I-864”]. 
8 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(C)–(D) (West 2014). 
9 Wherever a U.S. citizen or permanent resident files an immigration petition 
for a foreign family member, an I-864 form will be required. McLawsen, supra  
note 3, at 583. 
10 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(A). 
11 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a). 
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dependent on the government for subsistence,”12 the Attorney 
General and consular officers retain considerable discretion in 
their determination, using a set of statutorily defined factors.13 
While factors like the immigrant’s age, health, family status, 
financial health, and education are all part of the public charge 
determination, the Attorney General may also consider the 
Affidavit.14  In practice, the I-864 has been treated as an 
enforceable contract, which has meant that “a valid Form I-864 is 
virtually always sufficient to avoid inadmissibility on public 
charge grounds,” except in cases relating to extreme medical 
conditions.15  This setup has created a contractual scheme where, 
in consideration for undertaking the enforceable support 
obligations under the Affidavit,16 the Government virtually 
guarantees that the immigrant will not be deemed inadmissible 
as a public charge.17 
For a commonly executed contract that has been enforceable 
in court for nearly twenty years, case law has been sparse.18  
Specifically, it remains unclear whether common-law defenses 
like fraud, duress, “unclean hands,” and unconscionability apply 
to the Affidavit in most jurisdictions.19  While still an open 
question in many jurisdictions, the greatest volume of case law 
for common-law contract defenses in the Affidavit has addressed 
 
12 Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/public-charge. A recently enacted rule, however, 
changes the previous definition of “public charge” as “primarily dependent on the 
government,” and instead emphasizes the immigrant’s receipt of “means-tested 
public benefits.” Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292, 
41304, 41355–56 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 
245, & 248). The government justifies the change “as a policy matter” to remedy an 
“unduly restrictive” obstacle to making public charge determinations. Id. at 41356. 
13 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(B). 
14 Id. 
15 Greg McLawsen, USCIS Proposes New Public Charge Rules: The Form I-864 
will Become Table Stakes as Scrutiny Shifts to the Applicant, 23–21 BENDER’S 
IMMIGR. BULL. 01 (2018). 
16 See Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *6, (N.D. Ind. 
May 27, 2005). Additionally, the obligation may be enforced in “any appropriate 
court,” which has been determined to refer to both federal and state courts. 
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e) (2012). 
17 See McLawsen, supra note 15. 
18 Stephanie L. Tang, Arguing Affidavits of Support, 105 ILL. B. J. 34, 36 (2017). 
19 John Patrick Pratt & Ira J. Kurzban, The Affidavit of Support Creates a 
Legally Enforceable Contract by the Sponsored Foreign National: Efforts To Collect 
Damages as Support Obligations Against Divorced Spouses, 57 FED. LAW. 44, 45 
(2010). 
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a mitigation of damages defense.20  In the prototypical fact 
pattern, an immigrant, treated as third-party beneficiary to the 
Affidavit, seeks to enforce her rights against the sponsor, who 
pleads an affirmative mitigation duty in the hopes it will reduce 
his liability to the immigrant.21  One such case, Liu v. Mund, 
analyzes not only the issue of whether a mitigation of damages 
defense should apply to the Affidavit, but also larger issues 
pertaining to the fundamental character and purposes of the 
form.22 
Courts are currently split on the issue of whether a 
mitigation of damages defense is available to sponsors to the 
Affidavit.23  Leading cases, including Liu, rely upon the unique 
nature of the form to assert that such defenses are precluded.24  
This Note will argue that the I-864 should be treated under the 
same principles as a typical common-law contract.  Part I of this 
Note will trace the history of the I-864 form, primarily focusing 
on the legislation and case law rendering the form an enforceable 
contract.  Part II will discuss Liu v. Mund, focusing extensively 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 
legal and policy arguments, and how other courts have responded 
in its wake.  Subsequently, Part III will respond to the 
arguments in Liu, offering novel arguments.  Finally, Part III 
will offer analysis of the Affidavit in light of recently proposed 
executive action, making this Note the first to tie these executive 
actions directly to parties’ contract rights.25  Ultimately, this 
 
20 According to the Restatement of Contracts, “damages are not recoverable for 
loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or 
humiliation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 
1981). The rule hedges against waste by encouraging an injured party to make 
“reasonable efforts” to offset the injury resulting from a breach of contract. Id. The 
defense is pleaded affirmatively and does not create liability for the party, but 
merely offsets the damages to which the party may have been entitled under a 
breach of contract claim. Id. 
21 See, e.g., Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); see also Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 
2016); Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Dorsaneo v. 
Dorsaneo, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Stump, 2005 WL 1290658, at 
*1; Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 810–11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of 
Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 864 (Ct. App. 2017). 
22 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012). 
23 Tang, supra note 18, at 37. 
24 See infra Part III. 
25 See generally Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114 
(proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, & 
248). 
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Note argues that treating the I-864 form as a common-law 
contract is not only a proper reading of the authorizing statutes, 
but also that diverging from Liu will give courts flexibility to 
ensure just outcomes in litigation. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT 
IN PUBLIC CHARGE INADMISSIBILITY: FROM THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY UNTIL 2012 
While the enforceable Affidavit of Support is a somewhat 
recent invention, the exclusion of immigrants based on their 
purported likelihood of becoming a public charge is not.26  Indeed, 
the general Immigration Act of 1882, one of the first major 
Congressional immigration statutes, excluded from entry “idiots, 
lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become a public 
charge.”27  This ground for inadmissibility was reinforced in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) enacted in 1950.28  An 
immigrant could increase her odds of admission, however, by 
having a sponsor execute an I-134, an “affidavit of support,” that 
stated that the sponsor is “willing and able” to provide financial 
support to the sponsored immigrant to keep her from becoming a 
public charge.29  Subsequent case law, however, held that the 
I-134 was not intended to be a judicially enforceable contract, but 
merely a moral pledge amounting to one of several factors 
factoring into consular officials’ determination of whether the 
immigrant was likely to become a public charge.30 
The status of the “affidavit of support” requirement changed 
with the enactment of two statutes: The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), 
enacted on August 22, 1996,31 and the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 
 
26 Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Sep. 4, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-
history/early-american-immigration-policies. 
27 Id. 
28 See Rómulo E. Guevara & Frederick F. Calope, Origin and Evolution: Ten 
Years of the Affidavit of Support Under IIRIRA, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2849, 
2850 (Dec. 10, 2007). 
29 Id. 
30 San Diego Cty. v. Viloria, 276 Cal. App. 2d 350, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
31 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 [hereinafter PRWORA]. 
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enacted on September 30 of that same year.32  PRWORA, an 
omnibus welfare reform bill, modified the INA to create a legally 
enforceable “contract” between the Government and the sponsor 
of an immigrant beneficiary.33  IIRIRA retained the “contract” 
language while specifying the terms of this arrangement.34 
The Affidavit, after some initial ambiguity,35 went into full 
effect in 1999, per the guidelines of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service’s Field Guidance for public charge 
inadmissibility.36  Per PRWORA and IIRIRA, this new Affidavit, 
eventually the I-864, was mandatory in the public charge 
determination process and enforceable against the sponsor by the 
sponsored immigrant; federal, state, and local governments; and 
agencies providing means-tested benefits.37 
The obligations created under this form are “mighty.”38  For 
example, the sponsor must “maintain the sponsored alien at an 
annual income that is not less than 125% of the Federal poverty 
line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable.”39  As 
of 2015, this mandatory support amounts to approximately 
$15,000 annually for a single-person household, plus 
approximately $5,000 per month for each additional household 
member.40  Furthermore, these obligations are indefinite, 
terminating only when the sponsored immigrant (1) becomes a 
 
32 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (the provisions of IIRIRA were a 
rider on this omnibus appropriations bill). 
33 PRWORA, supra note 31. In pertinent part: “No affidavit of support may be 
accepted by the Attorney General or by any consular officer to establish that an alien 
is not excludable as a public charge under Section 212(a)(4) unless such affidavit is 
executed as a contract.” Id. sec. 213A(a) (emphasis added). 
34 See IIRIRA, supra note 32, sec. 213A. Here, among other provisions, the 
support obligation was tied to 125% of the federal poverty line. 
35 Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852. Because the new affidavit did not 
go into effect as mandatory until the official release of implementing regulations, it 
did not immediately supplant the I-134. 
36 Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge 
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed May 26, 1999). 
37 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B) (2012). The first known case upholding the form’s 
enforceability was Tornheim v. Kohn, where the court distinguished between the 
unenforceable I-134 form and the enforceable I-864. Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 
5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
38 McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586. 
39 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A). The contract also provides that the sponsor is 
required to notify USCIS of any change in address within 30 days of the change. 
I-864, supra note 7, at 7. 
40 See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593  
(Jan 22, 2014). 
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United States citizen, (2) completes forty quarters of work, 
(3) loses lawful permanent resident status and leaves the United 
States, (4) receives a new grant for adjustment of status with a 
new affidavit of support, or (5) dies.41  Furthermore, the Affidavit 
may be used by governments or other benefit-distributing 
agencies to recoup an immigrant’s ill-gotten benefits from 
sponsors.42  As an added note, the I-864 expressly provides that a 
divorce does not sever a sponsor’s obligations to the sponsored 
immigrant.43 
Case law under the I-864 has been relatively sparse.44  While 
governments and agencies retain the right to sue under the form, 
they have largely declined to do so because of a perception that 
the collection process is administratively burdensome and 
politically charged.45  For that reason, most of the cases seeking 
enforcement of the Affidavit have involved an immigrant seeking 
to enforce the support obligations, most particularly in the 
context of family law.46 
After the passage of PRWORA and IIRIRA, courts quickly 
identified the I-864 Affidavit of Support as an enforceable 
contract, standing in contrast to its predecessor.47  In Tornheim v. 
Kohn, the plaintiff sought to enforce sponsor obligations against 
the defendant, his father-in-law, using the statutory language 
created by PRWORA, IIRIRA, and the previously signed I-134 
affidavit of support.48  There, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York held that the I-134 was not an 
enforceable contract, but a “morally binding agreement,” holding, 
by implication, that the newer I-864 was the enforceable 





41 I-864, supra note 7, at 7; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(2)–(3). 
42 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e)(2). 
43 I-864, supra note 7, at 7 (“NOTE: Divorce does not terminate your 
obligations under Form I-864.” (emphasis in original)). 
44 Tang, supra note 18, at 36. 
45 Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852. 
46 See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Immigration Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) and 
Efforts To Collect Damages as Support Obligations Against Divorced Spouses – What 
Practitioners Need To Know, 83 FLA. B.J. 53, 53 (2009). 
47 Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852. 
48 Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, at *1 (Mar.  
26, 2002). 
49 Id. at *3. 
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parties’ rights has been sparse, but these rights were largely 
defined ten years later when the Seventh Circuit explored the 
issue in Liu v. Mund.50 
II. LIU V. MUND: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT TAKES A FIRM POSITION 
ON PARTIES’ CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE I-864 
A. Liu v. Mund: History and Procedural Posture 
Liu v. Mund, written by Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner, 
forged the landscape for interpreting the Affidavit of Support and 
remains the leading case on the topic of mitigation of damages.51  
The case centered on a failed marriage between Timothy Mund, 
an American from Wisconsin, and Wenfang Liu, a Chinese 
woman that he met and married while living in China.52  The 
couple executed an I-864 when they returned to the United 
States after two years of marriage, with Mund as the sponsor 
and Liu as the sponsored immigrant.53  After years of a difficult 
and allegedly abusive marriage, the couple divorced.54  When 
adjudicating the divorce, the Wisconsin divorce court declined to 
address the bearing of federal law, including the obligations 
under the I-864.55 
Liu then filed an independent suit in the Western District of 
Wisconsin seeking to enforce Mund’s obligations under the I-864 
Affidavit of Support.56  With respect to the issue of whether Liu 
was obligated to mitigate her damages, the court noted that 
Mund failed to properly plead the issue as an affirmative 
defense, and thus the issue was precluded.57  Despite this, the 
court noted that “the notion that an immigrant has a duty to 
mitigate damages not only seems fair, but is consistent with the 
notion of the plaintiff’s status as a third-party beneficiary to a 
 
50 Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586. 
51 McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586. 
52 Liu, 686 F.3d at 419. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.; see Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, Wenfang Liu at 5, Liu v. Mund, 
686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453). 
55 Id. As part of the divorce agreement, Mund was obligated to support Liu at 
$500 per month, on the condition that Liu seek work by making at least four job 
applications per month. Id. 
56 Id. at 420. 
57 Liu v. Mund, 748 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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contract.”58  The court then calculated the plaintiff’s damages, 
noting that Liu’s recovery of support obligations should be tied to 
her “reasonable efforts to seek work” during that time period.59 
Liu appealed this issue to the Seventh Circuit, where the 
court inquired broadly “whether in a suit to enforce the 
obligation of support created by the federal affidavit the plaintiff 
has a legal duty to mitigate damages.”60  That decision has since 
become an inflection point in the interpretation of the Affidavit 
and its requirements,61 and its reasoning is, therefore, worthy of 
close analysis. 
B. Liu v. Mund: Circuit Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit 
Rule Against the Application of a Mitigation of Damages 
Defense 
The Seventh Circuit eventually held that a mitigation 
defense would be unavailable to the sponsor of an Affidavit.62  
First, the court quickly rejected the premise that common law 
principles should govern the contract.63  Taking a dismissive 
tone, the court drew on its understanding of the history of the 
common law and its role in statutory interpretation: 
But the hoary maxim that statutory repeals of common law 
rules are disfavored is a poor guide to legislative meaning, for it 
is the fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English 
judges to legislation.  Those judges had made up the common 
law, which for an age was virtually the entire law of England, 
and they resented legislative interlopers.  One would hardly 
expect legislators to respond by being careful not to step into the 
common law flower bed.64 
Despite this approach, the court acknowledged that common law 
may play a role to provide “details that the legislators didn’t 
bother to specify.”65  For example, the court drew on the common 
law to hold that Liu, a third-party beneficiary to the Affidavit, 
would typically have the same duties and rights as a signatory to 
the contract.66 
 
58 Id. at 963–64. 
59 Id. at 965. 
60 Liu, 686 F.3d at 420. 
61 See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586. 
62 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422. 
63 Id. at 421. 
64 Id. (citations omitted). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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The court then posed the central question “whether reading 
a duty of mitigation into the immigration statute and the 
regulations and the affidavit-contract would serve or disserve 
statutory and regulatory objectives.”67  In other words, the 
Seventh Circuit framed the defense as an interposition, 
submitting it to the threshold test of whether it was consistent 
with the purposes of PRWORA and IIRIRA, rather than 
assuming that mitigation, as well as other common-law defenses, 
would be applied as a default or gap-filling rule to the Affidavit 
as part of the “contract” first articulated in PRWORA.68 
Gauging the statutory purpose behind the Affidavit, the 
court made its central distinction: 
The Justice Department argues as we noted that to impose a 
duty to mitigate would encourage immigrants to become self-
sufficient.  But self-sufficiency, though mentioned briefly in the 
House Conference Report on the 1996 statute as a goal, see H.R. 
Rep. No. 104–828, p. 241 (1996), is not the goal stated in the 
statute; the stated statutory goal, remember, is to prevent the 
admission to the United States of any alien who “is likely at any 
time to become a public charge.”69 
In the Seventh Circuit’s construction, then, the primary statutory 
purpose animating the Affidavit of Support requirement is not to 
ensure that immigrants who do come to the country are 
self-sufficient, but rather to prevent the entry of at-risk 
immigrants altogether by imposing a heavy burden on sponsors.70  
This distinction forms the core of Liu’s reasoning, as it formed 
the basis for the court to eschew the application of common-law 
principles.71  Further, it has largely been cited and relied upon 
directly by subsequent courts.72 
This distinction, however, requires some clarification.  First, 
the Seventh Circuit’s observations about “the 1996 statute” refer 
exclusively to IIRIRA, as is made clear by Judge Posner’s 
reference to IIRIRA’s House Report.73  As detailed earlier, the 
 
67 Id. 
68 Compare id. with infra notes 116–122 and accompanying text (illustrating a 
common assumption among lower courts that common-law contract defenses would 
apply as a default rule where the statute’s meaning was unclear). 
69 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. (“The absence of such a duty . . . tends to make prospective sponsors more 
cautious about sponsoring immigrants.”). 
71 Id. at 421. 
72 See infra Part II.C. 
73 See Liu, 686 F.3d at 420. In detailing the statutory history, the Circuit Court 
observes that sponsors’ affidavits “generally had not been understood to impose a 
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statute that made the Affidavit an enforceable contract was not 
IIRIRA, but the bill that preceded it: the omnibus welfare bill, 
PRWORA.74  Indeed, only the precise terms of the contract were 
elaborated in IIRIRA, not the fact of its enforceability.75  Despite 
this, neither PRWORA, nor its role in creating an enforceable 
Affidavit, were mentioned in the opinion.76  This observation is 
significant in light of the opinion’s distinction, as 
“self-sufficiency,” a concept dismissed in Judge Posner’s opinion, 
is indeed an express and fundamental purpose in the PRWORA 
scheme on welfare and immigration.77 
 
legal duty on the sponsor to support the sponsored person.” Id. The opinion then 
discusses that the Affidavit would eventually become enforceable but does not 
directly state which statute allowed that shift to come to pass. Id. 
74 See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 213A(a). Remember that the PRWORA, 
enacted on August 22, 1996, predated IIRIRA, which was enacted on September  
30, 1996. 
75 See supra Part I. 
76 See id. 
77 See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 400. The complete purpose statements for 
PRWORA’s approach to immigration and welfare are as follows: 
SEC. 400. STATEMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY CONCERNING 
WELFARE AND IMMIGRATION. 
The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy 
with respect to welfare and immigration: 
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration 
law since this country's earliest immigration statutes. 
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that— 
(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to 
meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the 
resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and 
(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for 
immigration to the United States. 
(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for 
and receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at 
increasing rates. 
(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable 
financial support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring 
that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system. 
(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility 
and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in 
accordance with national immigration policy. 
(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal 
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits. 
(7) With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning 
the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this title, a State that 
chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of 
such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the 
least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling governmental 
interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national 
immigration policy. 
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After setting forth its understanding of statutory purpose, 
the Seventh Circuit analyzed the potential policy implications 
and how the absence of a mitigation doctrine may affect the 
parties to the case.78  Indeed, Judge Posner confidently suggested 
that imposing an unconditional, indefinite support obligation 
may have affected Mr. Mund’s willingness to sponsor his wife in 
the first place.79  Judge Posner then examined Liu’s earning 
potential and compared it to the “meager” support obligation, 
concluding that Liu still had a “strong incentive” to seek 
employment.80 
Concluding, Judge Posner raised an array of arguments 
pertaining to judicial interests.  First, he cited the “increased 
complication” that allowing a mitigation defense would create 
when attempting to enforce the obligation.81  Then, Judge Posner 
questioned whether federal courts are a proper forum for such a 
dispute, seemingly eager to wash his and the court’s hands of 
“domestic-relations disputes.”82  While these issues are 
prominent in Judge Posner’s opinion, the legal distinction drawn 
from the supposed purpose of IIRIRA has formed the basis for 





Id. (emphases added). 
78 See Liu, 686 F.3d at 422. 
79 Id. (“Had [Mund] known that by bringing [Liu] to the United States he would 
be assuming a virtually unconditional obligation to support her indefinitely even if 
they later divorced, he might not have signed the affidavit, and the couple might 
have remained in China—and perhaps divorced there, ending her right to become a 
permanent resident of the United States.”). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 422–23. 
82 Id. at 423. This reluctance to enter into domestic relations law also seems 
motivated by a perception that this issue is too minor for the federal courts: 
The duty is federal and so would presumably be defined by federal common 
law. We are not pointed to any federal common law duty of mandatory job 
search, so the federal courts would have to create one for I–864 cases 
(should the courts ever see another one—which would be likely if we upheld 
the district court). It hardly seems worth the effort. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
83 See infra Part II.C. 
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C. Liu v. Mund: Other Jurisdictions Reinforce the Seventh 
Circuit’s Decision and Reasoning 
In the wake of Liu, most courts have relied upon the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning to preclude a mitigation of damages defense, 
with few exceptions.84  In Liu v. Kell, the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington not only relied on its reading of 
the statutory purpose to preclude a mitigation defense, but also 
shared the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to apply common law 
principles to the I-864 writ large.85  The North Carolina Court of 
Appeals took a similarly deferential stance in Zhu v. Deng, 
following the Seventh Circuit not only in its interpretation of 
IIRIRA and the Affidavit of Support requirement, but also in its 
reading of how and whether the common law should be applied.86  
In In re Marriage of Kumar, a California Court of Appeal 
deferred entirely to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning on the issue 
of mitigation, quoting the opinion extensively and denying the 
defense on the basis that “[w]e find Liu persuasive.”87 
Other subsequent cases have used Liu’s reasoning outside of 
the particular issue of mitigation.  In Erler v. Erler, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue 
of “household size” in the Affidavit, examining how that would 
affect the support required from an ex-spouse sponsor.88  In doing 
so, it drew on the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the 
Affidavit’s statutory purpose when discussing whether the 
sponsor or immigrant may receive “windfall benefits,” and 
ultimately decided that sponsors should bear the greater 
financial risk.89  In Dorsaneo v. Dorsaneo, the District Court for 
 
84 See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; see also Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648 
(RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013) (evaluating the split 
authorities, including Liu, on the issue of mitigation before holding that the 
plaintiff’s failure to mitigate remained a question of fact in the case). 
85 Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
86 Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). 
87 In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2017). 
88 Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016). The case involved a 
divorced immigrant spouse who moved in with her son after a divorce. Id. The court 
drew on Liu to hold that the son’s support of the ex-spouse would not offset the 
sponsor’s obligations of support, maintaining that “the sponsor is not an intended 
beneficiary of the affidavit-of-support requirement.” Id. at 1179. 
89 Id. (“Because the sponsor is not an intended beneficiary of the 
affidavit-of-support requirement, we see no reason why the sponsor, rather than the 
immigrant, should receive the windfall. To the contrary, allowing the sponsor to 
receive the windfall would undermine the purpose of the affidavit of support, which 
is to prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who is likely at any 
time to become a public charge. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, that purpose 
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the Northern District of California mirrored the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning when denying a defense of fraud in the 
inducement, another potential common-law defense to the 
Affidavit.90 
In Shah v. Shah, however, the District Court of New Jersey 
denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment where it found 
that there were triable issues of fact pertinent to plaintiff’s 
alleged failure to mitigate her damages.91  The court observed 
that “[c]ourts are divided” on the issue of mitigation,92 and did 
not adopt a definitive stance on the issue.93  The court also 
entertained, but subsequently dismissed, the defendant’s 
arguments asserting fraud and unconscionability, seemingly 
assuming that these common-law contract defenses could be 
applied to the Affidavit.94  Still, though, Liu remains the leading 
case on the issue, and courts, including the court in Shah, have 
not challenged its reasoning directly.95  The remainder of this 
Note, then, will focus primarily on why the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Liu should not be exclusively relied upon in 
interpreting the Affidavit. 
 
is best served by interpreting the affidavit in a way that makes prospective sponsors 
more cautious about sponsoring immigrants.” (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
90 Dorsaneo v. Dorsaneo, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[IIRIRA] 
and implementing regulations show that the purpose of the support obligation is to 
ensure that family-sponsored immigrants do not become a ‘public charge.’ ”). While 
the court did not cite directly to Liu to support this statement, it drew on similar 
portions of the legislative record and similarly did not explore PRWORA’s role in the 
statutory scheme. Id. It should also be observed that the Dorsaneo trial took place 
within the Ninth Circuit after Erler, the Ninth Circuit case that had previously 
drawn on Liu to discern the statutory purpose behind the Affidavit. See Erler, 824 
F.3d at 1179. 
91 See Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648 (RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *5 
(D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013). 
92 Shah, 2013 WL 12157867, at *5. 
93 Shah, decided in 2013, was written where the bulk of authority still assumed 
that common-law defenses could apply to the Affidavit. See infra Part III.A. 
94 Id. at *3–*4. 
95 See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; Shah, 2013 WL 12157867, at *5; see also 
Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 
808, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 871 
(Ct. App. 2017). 
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III. BREAKING DOWN THE ARGUMENTS: A HARD LOOK AT THE 
ARGUMENTS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
UNDERLYING LIU V. MUND 
In addressing the question of whether courts should apply a 
mitigation defense, the arguments from the case law and, more 
particularly, Liu v. Mund, may aptly be organized into a set of 
sub-issues: (1) whether common law contract principles are 
consistent with the statutory design of the Affidavit of Support; 
(2) whether the purpose of the affidavit requirement precludes 
the application of a mitigation duty—and, by implication, other 
common law contract defenses; (3) whether a mitigation inquiry 
may be justified in light of concerns about judicial efficiency; and 
(4) whether equitable considerations favor either a sponsor or 
immigrant assuming primary responsibility to prevent the 
immigrant from becoming a public charge.96  Another issue, not 
discussed in any depth in the case law, is possibly monumental: if 
the Government or benefit-issuing agencies attempt to enforce 
their rights under the Affidavit—as the Trump Administration 
has expressed a desire to do97—how should this weigh in courts’ 
interpretation of the obligations and nature of the Affidavit?  
This Part will address each of these sub-issues in turn. 
A. Common Law Contract Principles Should Be Applied to the 
Affidavit of Support Because Their Application is Consistent 
with PRWORA and IIRIRA, Principles of Statutory 
Construction, and Case Law Preceding Liu 
The pertinent statutory provisions set forth under PRWORA 
and IIRIRA, together with commonly applied principles of 
statutory construction, hedge in favor of the application of 
common law defenses to the I-864.  As an interpretive canon, 
courts presume that common-law rules will apply where 
Congress has used a word with a well-settled common law 
tradition and has not expressly defined it to mean otherwise.98  
 
96 See supra Part II(B). This analytical framework is derived primarily from the 
Liu opinion, as well as an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of plaintiff Wenfang Liu 
by attorney Frank Dickerson. See generally Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae to Assist 
the Court, Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453). 
97 See generally May 23 Memo, supra note 2. 
98 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
GEO. L.J. 341, 396–98 (2010); see also, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1,  
7–10 (2014) (drawing heavily from Black’s Law Dictionary and other common-law 
principles to distinguish between the meaning of a “statute of limitations” and a 
“statute of repose”). This canon is codified in several state statutes. Id. at 423–24; see 
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As Judge Posner acknowledges in Liu, “[t]he duty to mitigate is a 
conventional part of the common law of contracts and can be 
enforced against a third-party beneficiary.”99  Where the statute 
expressly provides for a “contract,” a concept with a well-settled 
common law tradition, this canon, combined with the statutory 
text, could dictate that a court should presume that Congress 
intended the Affidavit to contain the ancillary doctrines that flow 
from the common-law law of contracts, including mitigation  
of damages.100   
In the Liu opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit takes care 
to distance itself from common law canons when contemplating 
the issue of mitigation of damages.101  After describing his view of 
the history of common law,102 Circuit Judge Posner set aside 
common law principles and reframed the issue as one primarily 
pertaining to “statutory and regulatory objectives.”103  To support 
this approach, Judge Posner engaged in some sleight of hand: he 
cited to Prudential Ins. Co. v. Athmer, a decision he penned in 
1999 that has similarly dismissive language about the common 
law.104  Even in that case, however, Judge Posner acknowledged 
that an abundance of case law supported the principle that 
“when a question relating to the interpretation and 
administration of . . . [a government contract] arises that is not 
answered by the statute itself . . . the answer is to be supplied by 
federal common law.”105 
 
also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 2-4-203(d) (West 
2019); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-401(A) (West 2019). 
99 Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th  
Cir. 2012). 
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) 
(articulating the common-law mitigation doctrine). This approach was not necessary 
with the third-party beneficiary doctrine, however: The statute expressly provides 
that the immigrant shall be a third party to the Affidavit of Support. Liu, 686 F.3d 
at 420–21. 
101 Liu, 686 F.3d at 421. 
102 Id. (“[J]udges had made up the common law, which for an age was virtually 
the entire law of England, and they resented legislative interlopers. One would 
hardly expect legislators to respond by being careful not to step into the common law 
flower bed.”) (citations omitted). 
103 Id. 
104 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“Since the concept of ‘federal common law’ is nebulous when a statute is in the 
picture, it might be better to jettison the concept in that context and say simply that 
in filling gaps left by Congress in a federal program the courts seek to effectuate 
federal policies.”). 
105 Id. 
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Further, it is important to note that Judge Posner addressed 
a common-law canon that is distinct from the one described 
above.106  In Liu, Judge Posner addressed the presumption that 
“statutory repeals of common law rules are disfavored,” which he 
ultimately rebuked as a “hoary maxim.”107  This canon,108 
however, is distinct from the aforementioned presumption that 
Congress, when employing words with common-law traditions, 
does so with the understanding that their common-law meaning 
is intended.109  While Judge Posner correctly stipulated that the 
former canon is outdated and out of fashion,110 he did not address 
the latter canon, which would also be pertinent to the 
interpretation of the statutory requirement.111  Generally, in both 
Liu and Athmer, Judge Posner appeared eager to relegate federal 
common law to a doctrine of last resort, or at least diminish its 
importance in the statutory interpretation process, for ideological 
reasons.112 
This approach departs from the majority of previous cases to 
deal with the specific issue of mitigation under the Affidavit.  In 
Stump v. Stump, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana addressed whether an immigrant had a duty to mitigate 
her damages after a divorce from her husband, who was her 
sponsor under the form.113  The court examined the plaintiff’s 
efforts to secure employment both before and after the 
termination of the marriage.114  Taking these facts into 
consideration in its damages analysis, the court found that the 
plaintiff had made “reasonable efforts to obtain employment and 
 
106 See supra Part III.A. 
107 Liu, 686 F.3d at 421. 
108 A more precise articulation of this canon is that “statutes in derogation of the 
common law must be strictly construed.” Scott, supra note 98, at 396. 
109 See id. 
110 See Liu, 686 F.3d at 421 (“But the hoary maxim that statutory repeals of 
common law rules are disfavored is a poor guide to legislative meaning, for it is the 
fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English judges to legislation.”). In 2010, 
shortly before Liu was decided, the canon that “statutory repeals of common law 
rules are disfavored” had been expressly rejected in twenty states and codified in 
none. See Scott, supra note 98, at 424. 
111 Liu, 686 F.3d at 421. 
112 Judge Posner was a steadfast critic of interpretative canons. See Richard A. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 800, 806 (1983) (“I . . . think that most of the canons [of statutory 
construction] are just plain wrong.”). 
113 Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *1, (N.D. Ind. 
May 27, 2005). 
114 Id. at *3. 
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be self-sufficient” and denied the defendant a mitigation of 
damages defense on that factual basis.115  Ultimately, the Stump 
court did not expressly declare that a mitigation defense was 
available under the I-864, but it suggested that the defense 
should apply in a general sense for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff’s 
“reasonable efforts,” and not principles of law, were the primary 
grounds for denying the defense, and (2) “the duty to mitigate, or 
avoid, damages is a basic tenant of contract law.”116  The Stump 
court, then, assumed that common-law contract principles would 
govern enforcement of the I-864.117 
Cases from other jurisdictions generally took one of two 
approaches to the issue of mitigation: (1) they imposed the duty 
outright, or (2) they assumed that such a duty exists but held 
that the facts did not warrant its imposition.118  Such courts 
routinely considered a plaintiff’s “reasonable efforts” as a 
component of a plaintiff’s duty to mitigate under the affidavit.119  
Though Liu has been influential in deciding whether the 
Affidavit of Support should be interpreted according to common 
law contract principles, other courts have followed a different 
course.120  Whatever the merits of this argument against using 





115 Id. at *7. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at *5–*7. In the Stump court’s construction, the form included an offer 
and acceptance, and consideration for the support obligations was “ ‘the sponsored 
immigrant not being found inadmissible to the United States under section 
212(a)(4)(C).’ ” Id. at *6. 
118 See Naik v. Naik, 944 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“We 
construe this language to mean that . . . the sponsored immigrant is expected to 
engage in gainful employment, commensurate with his or her education, skills, 
training and ability to work in accordance with the common law duty to mitigate 
damages.”); see also Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (D. Md. 2009) 
(“Assuming the plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate her damages by seeking 
employment, she need not apply for every available job in order to mitigate her 
losses; she need only make reasonable efforts.”); Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 
1020, 1025–26 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (examining whether divorce settlement agreements, 
student loans, student grants, and affordable housing subsidies should be considered 
income to offset the defendant’s financial obligations under the I-864). 
119 See Younis, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 556; Naik, 944 A.2d at 717. 
120 Supra note 118 and accompanying text. As of the time of writing, Erler v. 
Erler, decided by the Ninth Circuit, represents the only other instance where a 
Federal Circuit Court has analyzed the I-864 in depth. 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th  
Cir. 2016). 
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not tether themselves to the Seventh Circuit’s particular 
approach from Liu and Athmer when deciding whether to apply 
those principles to the Affidavit.121 
B. The Seventh Circuit, in Liu, Misconstrued the Statutory 
Purpose of the Affidavit Because Concerns About Immigrants’ 
Self-Sufficiency Are Central to the Requirement 
It follows logically that, if the Seventh Circuit sought to 
relegate common law principles to a doctrine-of-last-resort role, it 
would need to find that the statutory purpose was sufficiently 
clear to preclude their use.  Where the defendant in Liu argued 
that the purpose is a “general principle of self-sufficiency,”122 the 
Seventh Circuit found that the purpose of the Affidavit is a 
distinct one: “to prevent the admission to the United States of 
any alien who ‘is likely at any time to become a public 
charge.’ ”123  It would be a mistake, however, to rely uncritically 
upon this distinction without further exploring the concept of 
self-sufficiency.124 
As discussed earlier, the Seventh Circuit’s claim that 
“self-sufficiency . . . is not the goal stated in the statute” is 
misleading.125  When discussing the statutory history, the 
Seventh Circuit fails to mention that the Affidavit’s 
enforceability requirement comes not from IIRIRA, an 
immigration-based statute, but from PRWORA, a welfare reform 




121 A logical alternative would be to use an approach similar to the approaches 
used in Stump, Naik, and Shah. 
122 Brief of Amicus Curae United States of America Not in Support of a 
Particular Party or Outcome at 13, Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 
11-1453). The government further draws directly from the text of PRWORA: 
“Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since 
this country’s earliest immigration statutes.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (2006). 
123 Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
124 See, e.g., Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (“[W]hile 
an immigrant's self-sufficiency may be a compelling goal, it is not the purpose of the 
I–864 Affidavit, which is to ensure the immigrant does not become a ‘public 
charge.’ ” (quoting Liu, 686 F.3d at 422)); Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 819 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016); Villars v. Villars, 305 P.3d 321, 325 (Alaska 2013) (“The purpose  
of § 1183a is to provide a minimum level of support so that the sponsored immigrant 
does not become a public charge.” (citing Liu, 686 F.3d at 422–23)). 
125 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422; see also supra Part II.B. 
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the receipt of public benefits.126  For this reason, the concept of 
self-sufficiency should not be dismissed offhand, but analyzed, 
particularly in relation to the public charge doctrine. 
The Seventh Circuit argues that “it is not for [the sponsor’s] 
benefit that the duty of support was imposed; it was imposed for 
the benefit of federal and state taxpayers and of the donors to 
organizations that provide charity for the poor.”127  In the court’s 
view, the primary beneficiaries of the Affidavit, and, vis-à-vis, the 
public charge doctrine, are the taxpayers and donors who would 
not need to support an immigrant who is a draw on public 
resources.128  In this interpretation, it would stand to reason that 
(1) an obligation without excusing conditions and (2) deterrence 
are primary objectives of the Affidavit.129  If the obligations of the 
Affidavit are clear and restrictive, the reasoning goes, taxpayers 
would assume less risk that the immigrant will draw on public 
resources for support if (1) sponsors have a difficult-to-escape 
payment obligation and (2) sponsors have an incentive to refuse 
to support a financially risky immigrant. 
It is less clear, however, how the Seventh Circuit might 
interpret the goal of self-sufficiency and whom the beneficiaries 
of such a goal might be.130  There are several ways to interpret 
self-sufficiency in the context of the Affidavit.  A narrow 
interpretation would be that self-sufficiency refers merely to an 
immigrant’s freedom from financial dependence on the state.131  A 
second interpretation would refer to an immigrant’s 
self-sufficiency as independent not only from the state, but also 
from others, perhaps including the sponsor.132  This second 
reading would not only construct self-sufficiency as an economic 
principle, but also link it with a broad moral principle of 
self-reliance.133 
 
126 See supra Part II.B. 
127 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. Though not expressly included in the Affidavit of Support 
requirement, immigrants’ “self-sufficiency” was a preeminent policy consideration 
underlying IIRIRA. 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
131 To some extent, this interpretation would harmonize with the 104th 
Congress’ policy statements concerning welfare and immigration. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1601. 
132 This interpretation is supported by the IIRIRA legislative record as well as 
one of the terminating conditions in the Affidavit, discussed infra Part III.B. 
133 This approach is consistent with PRWORA, as well as the government 
amicus curiae’s position in Liu v. Mund. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of 
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If self-sufficiency is narrowly understood as an immigrant’s 
freedom from financial dependence on the state, then it is merely 
a mirror of the public charge concept.134  It could only be 
distinguished in terms of perspective: the primary objective of 
self-sufficiency would, in this case, be an immigrant’s freedom 
from dependence on public resources.135  In that scenario, a 
self-sufficient person could be reduced to the opposite of a public 
charge.  Followed logically, this definition would render the 
Seventh Circuit’s distinction a non-sequitur.136  In Liu, the 
Seventh Circuit sidestepped the issue and dismissed the 
self-sufficiency principle in its entirety, despite its centrality in 
the statutory scheme.137  In doing so, it entirely cast aside 
PRWORA—the statute that authorized the Affidavit’s 
enforceability requirement—and interpreted the Affidavit as 
being concerned primarily with economic burden-shifting and the 
protection of taxpayer interests.138 
The legislative history, structure of the Affidavit, and other 
factors further suggest that the purposes of the Affidavit extend 
beyond those set forth in Liu.  Most obviously, the full titles for 
 
America Not in Support of a Particular Party or Outcome at 13, Liu v. Mund, 686 
F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453) (“[T]he general principle of self-sufficiency 
underlying the immigration system counsels in favor of a duty to mitigate.”) 
(emphasis added). 
134 See id. 
135 This would comport with the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 
definition of “public charge:” “an alien who has become (for deportation purposes) or 
who is likely to become (for admission/adjustment purposes) ‘primarily on the 
government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public cash 
assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at 
government expense.’ ” Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on 
Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed May 26, 1999). It would also 
harmonize with the stated policy goal that “[i]t continues to be the immigration 
policy of the United States that aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on 
public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and 
the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A). 
136 Substituting the term “public charge” for “person who is not self-sufficient:” 
“But self-sufficiency . . . is not the goal stated in the statute; the stated statutory 
goal, remember, is to prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is 
likely at any time to become a person who is not self-sufficient.’ ” Liu v. Mund, 686 
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012). A doctrine that 
would exclude not-self-sufficient people would hardly contravene a principle of self-
sufficiency. 
137 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (stating PRWORA’s first 
statement of policy with respect to immigration and welfare is that “[s]elf-sufficiency 
has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since the country’s 
earliest immigration statutes”). 
138 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422. 
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each piece of legislation pertinent to the Affidavit—(1) the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, and (2) the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act—suggest that self-sufficiency was at the 
forefront of Congress’ considerations when it made the Affidavit 
an enforceable contract.  Even more tellingly, PRWORA, the 
statute that made the Affidavit an enforceable contract, does not 
mention public charge determinations outside of the specific 
provision rendering the Affidavit enforceable.139  These factors 
suggest that the self-sufficiency of previously admitted 
immigrants, and not the admissibility of incoming immigrants, 
was the foremost concern of the Affidavit requirement. 
Furthermore, within the PRWORA scheme, the Affidavit’s 
enforceability requirement is placed among restrictions on 
immigrants’ access to public benefits.  No other provisions in that 
section pertain to an immigrant’s inadmissibility to the United 
States under the public charge doctrine.140  More broadly, 
PRWORA’s central provisions deal primarily with broad-based 
reforms to public benefits programs;141 concerns about 
immigrants’ admissibility are, at best, an afterthought in the 
overall scheme and purpose of PRWORA.142 
Even independently of an analysis of PRWORA, there is 
ample evidence in IIRIRA that the purposes for the Affidavit 
extend beyond deterrence.  House Reports for IIRIRA discuss the 
Affidavit squarely in the context of encouraging an immigrant’s 
self-reliance, declaring “[t]he provision is designed to encourage 
immigrants to be self-reliant in accordance with national 
immigration policy.”143  Here and elsewhere in the report, 
Congress seems concerned with the behavior of the immigrant, 
and not the sponsor, with respect to the question of who shall 
bear responsibility to prevent the immigrant from becoming a 
public charge.144  This concern suggests that the purpose 
 
139 See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 423. 
140 See id. sec. 400. 
141 Such reforms include: (1) apportioning the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families on the basis of block grants, (2) restricting eligibility for the Supplemental 
Security Income program, and (3) implementing various provisions related to 
children’s welfare. See PRWORA, supra note 31, secs. 100, 200–04, 400. 
142 But see id. sec. 400(6) (“It is a compelling government interest to remove the 
incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”). 
143 H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 241 (1996) (emphasis added). “Self-reliance” and 
“self-sufficiency” are terms used interchangeably in the legislative record. 
144 Id. at 127; see also id. at 238 (“The purpose of the congressional grants of 
authority to States regarding eligibility for public benefits contained in this Act is to 
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underlying the Affidavit is not only economic burden-shifting, but 
also a moral principle that immigrants should seek to find work 
and to become self-sufficient.145 
This reading is also supported by the structure of the 
Affidavit itself, particularly in its terminating condition that 
releases the sponsor from the support obligations where the 
immigrant accumulates a certain amount of work.146  If 
protecting taxpayers and communities from dependent 
immigrants is the sole purpose of the Affidavit requirement, 
terminating the sponsor’s support obligation upon completion of 
ten years of work would do nothing to effectuate that purpose.147  
Further, of the five terminating conditions contained in the 
Affidavit, the accumulation-of-work condition is the only 




encourage States to implement the national immigration policy of assuring that 
aliens be self-reliant and not become public charges-a fundamental part of U.S. 
immigration policy since 1882.” (emphasis added)). That second passage is also 
persuasive; if “self-reliance” and “not becom[ing a] public charge[]” are synonymous, 
then this statement would be repetitive. The congressional record suggests instead 
that self-reliance is primarily a moral principle, while public charge is more 
concerned with economic distribution and resources. 
145 Id. at 241. This report suggests a reading that sponsors play a “safety net” 
role instead of assuming primary and sole responsibility for the immigrant. See 
McLawsen, supra note 15. 
146 IIRIRA provides: 
An affidavit of support is not enforceable after such time as the alien (i) has 
worked 40 qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under title II of the 
Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A § 401 et seq.] or can be credited with such 
qualifying quarters as provided under subparagraph (B) . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
147 If an immigrant has met the work requirement, the immigrant’s sponsor 
would be released from the support obligation under the Affidavit. At this time, 
there would be no binding guarantee that would preclude the immigrant from 
becoming a public charge or that would allow the state to recoup benefits in that 
instance. If the purpose of the affidavit were merely to protect taxpayers, this 
terminating condition would contravene that purpose by precluding sponsor liability 
where the immigrant becomes a public charge. While it could be argued that 
meeting the condition demonstrates that the immigrant has a low risk of becoming a 
public charge, it is more plausible to conclude that the work condition (a) provides 
an incentive to the sponsor to encourage the sponsored immigrant to seek work, or 
(b) communicates the government’s expectation that the immigrant will make 
good-faith efforts to become self-reliant, or both. 
148 The other four grounds for termination are (1) death, (2) naturalization, 
(3) loss of lawful permanent resident status, or (4) replacement of the Affidavit. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1183a. 
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This condition, seemingly inconsistent with the other 
components of the Affidavit, has parallel provisions in 
PRWORA.149  These provisions deal with eligibility for certain 
federal and state benefit programs.150  Tellingly, none of those 
provisions deal with issues of public charge admissibility.  
Instead, they pertain only to the receipt of public benefits after 
an immigrant has already arrived.151 
Both the legislative history and the structure of the Affidavit 
suggest that the purpose of the Affidavit requirement is not just 
to assign responsibility for the immigrant to the sponsor, but also 
to encourage an immigrant to become personally self-sufficient 
both morally and economically.  At best, it can be said that 
Congress’ purpose for the Affidavit is mixed.  The Affidavit 
serves the dual purposes of (1) protecting taxpayers from 
immigrants becoming a strain on public resources and 
(2) encouraging immigrants to seek employment with the goal of 
becoming self-sufficient.152  These purposes lead to opposite 
outcomes with respect to a mitigation requirement.153  The 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Liu, however, finds a singular 
purpose for the Affidavit requirement where the authorizing 
statutes are, at best, ambiguous.  This outcome may be justified, 
or at least explained, however, by the court’s ideological 
disposition toward applying the common law154 and the court’s 





149 See PRWORA, supra note 31, secs. 402(a)(2)(B)(ii), 402(b)(2)(B)(ii), 
412(b)(2)(B)(i) (tying eligibility for certain benefits into an attainment of “40 
qualifying quarters of coverage”). 
150 See id. 
151 See id. secs. 402, 412. 
152 See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text. 
153 If the primary purpose is to shift a burden onto the sponsor, then a 
mitigation of damages defense would contravene this purpose by releasing the 
sponsor from at least a part of the support obligation. If the primary purpose is to 
encourage self-reliant behavior by the immigrant, a mitigation of damages defense 
would encourage that behavior by compelling the immigrant to secure resources 
independently of the sponsor. 
154 See supra Part III(A). If the court is reluctant to apply the common law, it 
follows logically that the court might dig deeper to find a clear legislative purpose to 
avoid its use, even if such a purpose is not evident from the text of the statute. 
155 See supra Part III (identifying the subissues of judicial efficiency and 
equitable concerns). 
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Concerns About Judicial Efficiency 
Should Not Persuade Courts To Adopt That Court’s 
Interpretation of the Affidavit of Support Requirement 
In later decisions, the Seventh Circuit moved away from 
statutory analysis and examined the issue of mitigation from a 
cost-benefit perspective.156  Focusing on the “meager” support 
obligation,157 Judge Posner concluded that the court could not 
“see much benefit” in imposing a duty to mitigate on the 
immigrant compared to the cost of imposing it in the present 
case.158  Indeed, the plaintiff in Liu was entitled to just over ten 
thousand dollars.159  If, then, the defendant’s mitigation defense 
were properly pleaded and corroborated with factual evidence, it 
would have set off only a few thousand dollars at most.160  In the 
specific context of Liu, then, it is easy to see how the cost of 
imposing the defense would outweigh the potential benefit. 
While it may have made sense to dismiss a mitigation 
defense in this specific factual context, the obligation should not 
be dismissed broadly.161  The support obligation is (1) indefinite, 
and thus can accrue considerably over time,162 and is (2) distinct 
in a majority of states from other familial support obligations.163  
In different factual scenarios,164 the benefits to imposing duty to 
mitigate could certainly offset the costs from a standpoint of 




156 See Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422–23 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
157 Id. at 422. At the time of decision, the support obligation, tied to the National 
Poverty Line, was roughly $13,500 per year for an individual. Id. at 419. 
158 Id. at 422–23. When referring to “cost,” Judge Posner refers to the burden of 
the factual investigation necessary to impose a mitigation of damages defense; here, 
his language is dismissive, and resists “the increased complication of enforcing the 
duty of support” and federal courts’ involvement in “domestic-relations disputes.” Id. 
159 Liu v. Mund, 748 F. Supp. 2d, 958, 965 (W.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012). 
160 Id. 
161 See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586. 
162 Governments and benefits-issuing agencies may sue for benefits received in 
the ten years preceding the action. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(2)(C) (2012). 
163 See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 589. 
164 It would not be difficult to imagine a scenario where more damages were on 
the line than a few thousand dollars. See infra Part III.E. 
165 See Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422–23 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
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obligation would be “mighty” and not “meager;”166 courts should 
retain distance from Liu to ensure more equitable outcomes 
where the facts differ.167 
D. While the Liu Result May Have Been a Fair Result for the 
Case, A Broad Denial of a Mitigation of Damages Defense 
Could Yield Unfair Results and Abuse 
Many of the mitigation of damages cases under the I-864 
involve two competing narratives: the immigrant alleges that the 
sponsor is spitefully withholding payments to his ex-spouse, 
while the sponsor alleges that the immigrant is free-riding.168  
Indeed, Liu alleged that Mund was adulterous, as well as 
physically and psychologically abusive toward her.169  While such 
facts were in dispute, Judge Posner mentioned that the parties 
“had an awful marriage,” and he insinuated that the defendant’s 
actions may have been “motivated . . . by spite.”170  If the court 
felt, as these facts and language suggest, that the plaintiff was 
more sympathetic than the defendant in this case, it would make 
sense from an equitable standpoint to deny Mund a mitigation 
defense. 
From a more general standpoint, however, the court 
stumbled when it addressed the potential issue of free-riding.  
The court acknowledged that “the duty of support acts as a heavy 
tax on earned income” for an immigrant, where a low-earning 
immigrant would have little incentive to seek work absent a duty 
to mitigate damages.171  If one of the animating purposes of the 
Affidavit is “to encourage immigrants to be self-reliant,” such an 
 
166 McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; Liu, 686 F.3d at 422. 
167 See, e.g., Erler v. Erler, No. CV-12-2793-CRB, 2013 WL 6139721, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (“[C]ourts must strike a balance between ensuring that the 
immigrant's income is sufficient to prevent her from becoming a public charge while 
preventing unjust enrichment to the immigrant.”), vacated and remanded, 824 F.3d 
1173 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit drew primarily from Liu’s understanding of 
the Affidavit in deciding whether a sponsor owed support to his divorced immigrant 
spouse where she had been living with, and was supported by, her adult son. Erler, 
824 F.3d at 1179. 
168 See, e.g., Li Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1132–33 (W.D. Wash. 2017); 
Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648 (RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 
28, 2013); In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2017). 
169 Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, Wenfang Liu, Liu, 686 F.3d 418  
(No. 11-1453), 2012 WL 481399, at *7. 
170 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422–23. 
171 Id. at 422 (noting that if Liu were to secure a job and earn $15,000 per year, 
she would be working for a net gain of only $1,500 when compared to the $13,500 
worth of support she would otherwise be entitled to under the Affidavit). 
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incentive against seeking work would directly contravene that 
purpose.172  In Liu, Judge Posner sidesteps this potential issue, 
making favorable assumptions about the plaintiff to minimize 
concerns about free-riding in the context of her case.173  Absent 
these particular facts—and, perhaps, absent similar willingness  
to make bold assumptions about a person’s earning  
potential—courts should distance themselves from Liu, following 
other courts to take a more balanced approach to the incentives 
created by the affidavit.174 
E. A Speculative Issue: Which Approach Courts Should Take If 
or When Federal or State Governments Attempt to Enforce 
Their Rights Under the Affidavit 
While Liu and most cases discussed above have involved an 
immigrant enforcing her rights under the Affidavit, courts should 
not dismiss the possibility that the Federal Government, state 
governments, or other agencies could attempt to do the same.175  
Currently, fear of political backlash is considered a primary 
deterrent preventing governments and agencies from attempting 
to recoup benefits from immigrants’ sponsors.176  If, however, 
political factors pressured agencies to enforce the Affidavits,177 it 
is possible that agencies and governments would do so on a 
massive scale.178  Indeed, a memorandum issued by the Trump 
 
172 See supra Part III.B (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 241 (1996)). 
173 Liu, 686 F.3d at 422 (“But [Liu] might be able to get, or work her way up to, 
a much better job than one that pays $15,000, which is barely minimum wage. 
College educated, she may just need to improve her spoken English to get a good job. 
Most Chinese immigrants nowadays do very well in the United States.”). 
174 See, e.g., Erler v. Erler, No. CV-12-2793-CRB, 2013 WL 6139721, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (“[C]ourts must strike a balance between ensuring that the 
immigrant’s income is sufficient to prevent her from becoming a public charge while 
preventing unjust enrichment to the immigrant.”), vacated and remanded, 824 F.3d 
1173 (9th Cir. 2016); Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *9, 
(N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005). 
175 8 U.S.C. 1183a(e)(2) (2012). 
176 Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852. 
177 The Trump Administration’s new public charge guidelines, which define and 
expand the benefits which fall under the “public charge” designation, are likely to 
increase sponsors’ liability where they sponsor immigrants who are receiving public 
benefits. See Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41320 (Aug. 
12, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, & 248). This change 
will, at the very least, increase state agencies’ purely economic incentives to enforce 
their rights under the Affidavit. 
178 In one dramatic instance, the Connecticut Department of Social Services 
sued roughly 300 sponsors under the Affidavit for benefits received by immigrants 
under Medicaid and the State-Administered General Assistance Program. Ann 
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Administration on May 23, 2019, attempts to do exactly that: 
within ninety days of publication of the memorandum, various 
agencies must issue guidance and procedures on how to seek 
reimbursement from sponsors under the Affidavit.179  Taken 
together with the purpose statements in the memorandum, it is 
clear that the Trump Administration intends to put pressure on 
agencies to utilize these newly minted procedures and to enforce 
the Affidavits.180  If such enforcement efforts were to take place, 
it is unclear what defenses immigrants and their sponsors would 
have, especially given the scarcity of case law.181 
When contemplating actions for enforcement of the Affidavit, 
it is imperative that courts understand how recent changes to the 
public charge doctrine have altered parties’ rights.  A final rule 
published on the Federal Register on August 14, 2019, makes 
fundamental changes to the public charge doctrine and to the 
Affidavit’s role in the determination process.182  First, it expands 
the scope of benefits that are to be included in public charge 
determination, divided into two principal categories of 
“monetizable” and “non-monetizable” benefits.183  Courts should 
be attentive to the benefit scheme in the new benefit guidelines; 
one commentator noted that the standards may be “utterly 
Byzantine to the layperson,” and therefore, also to the signatories 
of the Affidavit.184 
 
Marie Somma, State Suing Immigrants’ Sponsors, THE HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 1, 
2007), http://articles.courant.com/2007-03-01/news/0703010724_1_legal-immigrants-
immigration-advocates-sponsors. The state’s then-Attorney General and future 
Democratic Senator, Richard Blumenthal, shut down the effort. Id. 
179 See May 23 Memo, supra note 2. 
180 See id. (“A key priority of my Administration is restoring the rule of law by 
ensuring that existing immigration laws are enforced. The immigration laws 
currently require that, when an alien receives certain forms of means-tested public 
benefits, the government or non-government entity providing the public benefit must 
request reimbursement from the alien’s financial sponsor.” (emphasis added)). It 
should be observed that requests for reimbursement only become mandatory “[u]pon 
notification that a sponsored alien has received any means-tested public benefit.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(1)(A). This characterization of the law is consistent with the 
Trump Administration’s stated intent to place pressure on agencies to enforce  
the Affidavits. 
181 Tang, supra note 18, at 36. Megan McLeod, an attorney with Connecticut 
Legal Services in Stamford, Connecticut, expanded on some policy implications of 
enforcement: “You sponsor an immigrant . . . and that person develops a need for a 
lung transplant. It’s completely impossible and grossly unfair for a sponsor to be 
charged with paying that back.” Somma, supra note 178 (alteration in original). 
182 Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41320, 41439. 
183 Id. at 41295, 41297. 
184 McLawsen, supra note 15. 
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A second major change is a reworking of the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test and an express statement that 
“plac[ing] an emphasis on the affidavit of support in the public 
charge determination” is contrary to the design of the 
determinations.185  While this is consistent with the statutory 
scheme, it departs from current procedures, where a sufficiently 
executed Affidavit is “virtually always” sufficient to preclude a 
public charge determination.186  Third, the rules will permit an 
applicant who is inadmissible on public charge grounds to post a 
$10,000 bond that will remain in effect until one of five 
conditions is met and that may be forfeited when the sponsored 
immigrant receives public benefits.187  While these rules are 
subject to change, they may call into question some of the legal 
reasoning underlying Liu.188 
For example, imagine a hypothetical scenario where an 
immigrant, enrolled in non-emergency Medicaid,189 receives an 
annual average of $20,000 of benefits for a period of ten years.190  
Theoretically, the sponsor would be liable to the state’s Medicaid 
agency for the $200,000 received in public benefits, as he failed to 
provide the support necessary to keep the immigrant from 
becoming a public charge.191  If the distributing agency were to 
bring charges, then, what defenses might the sponsor have to 
this action?  If Liu’s reasoning holds firm, such harsh 
consequences for the sponsor would further the purpose of the 
Affidavit by recouping benefits for the intended beneficiaries to 
the Affidavit—taxpayers—and possibly deterring sponsors from 
 
185 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41439. The 
reverse, however, is not true: any immigrant who fails to submit a facially sufficient 
Affidavit will be deemed inadmissible as likely to become a public charge.  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(2). 
186 McLawsen, supra note 15; see also 84 Fed. Reg. at 41439. 
187 See McLawsen, supra note 15. 
188 See supra Part II.B. 
189 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114, 51159–60 
(proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, & 
248). The Trump Administration’s recent proposal permits non-emergency Medicaid 
to be considered under consideration for public charge purposes, and estimates an 
average annual benefit per beneficiary to be $7,426.59. Id.  
190 See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(2)(C) (2012) (providing that governments or other 
benefit-issuing agencies may not pray for benefits that were issued more than ten 
years before the onset of the action). This hypothetical scenario, then, imagines a 
prayer amount of 270% of the estimated annual average of benefits received, 
multiplied by the maximum number of years under which the government may seek 
benefits under the statute. 
191 See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(2). 
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supporting immigrants in the first place.192  However, if courts 
depart from Liu’s reasoning and permit common law defenses,193 
any of the following might be available to sponsors: lack of 
consideration,194 void for vagueness or lack of clear terms,195 and 
unconscionability,196 among others.197  Departing from Liu and 
remaining open to common law defenses, then, could grant courts 
the necessary flexibility to prevent harsh outcomes for sponsors 
and immigrants alike. 
 
192 See supra Part II.B. 
193 See Pratt & Kurzban, supra note 19, at 46–47. 
194 Stump addressed this issue by providing that the immigrant not being found 
inadmissible was the consideration to the Affidavit. Stump v. Stump, No. 
1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *6, (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005). It is crucial to 
note, however, that the Trump administration’s recent proposal would alter the role 
of the Affidavit of Support in public charge determinations. See supra notes 185–186 
and accompanying text. If this change were to take effect, it would be necessary to 
revisit the Stump formulation because the consideration to the Affidavit would be 
different in character. Instead of nearly guaranteeing a waiver of inadmissibility on 
public charge grounds, the Affidavit’s role would be weakened to being just one 
small factor in a totality-of-the-circumstances test. With this weakened 
consideration for the sponsor, along with the government’s increased  
consideration—expansion of the benefit scheme—the Affidavit would be more 
susceptible to a lack-of-consideration defense than it currently is under Stump and 
similar jurisprudence. 
195 The Affidavit of Support, or Form I-864, currently does not specify or name 
any of the benefits listed by the Federal Register notice. Rather, it alludes to “any 
covered means-tested public benefit” without an explicit definition of the term or 
reference to a Federal Register notice. I-864, supra note 7, at 7. As the scheme of 
“covered . . . public benefit[s]” is in flux and may become “utterly Byzantine to the 
layperson,” this could prove fertile ground for a void-for-vagueness defense by the 
sponsor. See McLawsen, supra note 15. 
196 It has been argued that the Affidavit of Support is akin to an unconscionable 
“contract of adhesion.” See Al-Mansour v. Shraim, Civil No. CCB-10-1729, 2011 WL 
345876, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2011). These arguments have been largely 
unsuccessful, but have not yet been utilized in a scenario where the government, not 
an immigrant, is attempting to enforce its rights. See id at *3.; see also Anderson v. 
United States, No. C17-0891RSL, 2017 WL 6558255, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 
2017) (emphasizing that the Affidavit’s potential unfairness does not rise to the level 
of unconscionability). Unconscionability, however, could be a potent argument in 
certain scenarios, like where an unsophisticated sponsor takes on a vast support 
obligation by filling an I-864 without proper counsel—a frequent occurrence. 
197 Along with other contract defenses, attorneys’ conflicts of interest between a 
sponsor’s and sponsored immigrant’s interests would be worthy of close analysis if 
the public charge benefit scheme is expanded. 
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CONCLUSION: 
COURTS SHOULD NOT RELY SOLELY ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
FLAWED REASONING IN LIU V. MUND WHEN ADDRESSING THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT REQUIREMENT 
Courts should not rely on Liu’s reasoning to preclude 
common law contract defenses, including the duty to mitigate 
damages, when adjudicating the Affidavit of Support.  The 
court’s reasoning was seemingly rooted in (1) the Seventh 
Circuit’s ideological disposition toward the common law, (2) a 
misleading analysis of the statutory history, and (3) the 
particular factual circumstances of Liu.  If followed to its logical 
conclusion, the effects of Liu could be catastrophic for low-income 
immigrants and sponsors, and they do little to achieve the goals 
underlying the Affidavit requirement.  Courts, simply put, should 
not rely on Liu to preclude common-law defenses that are “basic 
tenant[s] of contract law.”198  Therefore, on grounds of legal 
reasoning, statutory interpretation, sound policy, and good 
conscience, courts should not feel obligated to support the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Liu v. Mund. 
 
198 Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 2757329, at *7, (N.D. Ind. 
Oct. 25, 2005). 
